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THE OLD AGE WALL: THE 
PROBLEM OF GAINING ACCESS 
TO NURSING HOME RESIDENTS 
Jaya R. Salzman* 
As public awareness of nursing home problems has in-
creased, community organizations have formed to redress the 
problems and alleviate the loneliness of the isolated elderly and 
disabled. Nursing homes or "warehouses for the dying"l are 
. populated by elderly and infirm patients, predominantly 
women,2 who suffer from three to four chronic conditions, one of 
which is usually a mental or psychological problem.3 Many pa-
tients are overdrugged,' malnourished,1I or left lying in their bod-
ily wastes for hours.6 Because bedridden patients are not turned 
regularly, they may develop bedsores which can become infected 
or gangrenous.7 Many nursing homes do not meet the minimal 
government standards for sanitation or patient care,s which can 
result in patient injuries and deaths.9 Boredom abounds in these 
institutions because patients have few recreational or social ac-
tivities,IO and few receive visitors.l1 
Nursing home administrators often respond to community 
* Student, Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1984. 
1. Speech by then President Richard M. Nixon to American Association of Retired 
Persons/National Retired Teachers Association in Chicago, Illinois (June 25, 1971) re-
printed in B. VLADECK, UNLOVING CARE 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as VLADECK]. 
2. Pre-1970 studies show that women in nursing homes outnumber men two to one; 
studies during the early 1970's show that women outnumber men three to one. Subcom-
mittee on Long-Term Care of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, Nursing Home 
Care in the United States: Failure in Public Policy, Introductory Report, S. Rep. No. 
1420, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Introductory Report]. Women 
comprise 71 % of the nursing home population. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, National Nursing Home Survey: 
1977 Summary for the United States, Vital & Health Statistics, series 13, No. 43 (PHS) 
79-1794, Table 19, at 29 (1979» [hereinafter cited as 1977 Survey]. 
3. VLADECK, supra note I, at 14. 
4. Id. at 18. 
5. R. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA 265 (1975). 
6. Id. at 263, 265. 
7. Id. at 265. 
8. Introductory Report, supra note 2, at 76-77. 
9. See, e.g., infra notes 31 and 37. 
10. BUTLER, supra note 5, at 265. 
11. Only 10% of nursing home patients have a living spouse, almost 50% have no 
viable relationship with a close relative, and most receive no visitors. Introductory Re-
port, supra note 2, at 16, 18. 
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groups who wish to help residents by locking the doors in an 
attempt to maintain the wall of silence between the residents 
and the outside world, thus preventing the public from interfer-
ing with their management of these business enterprises. Advo-
cates have been forced to battle to gain access for three pur-
poses: to inform patients of their statutory and constitutional 
rights and help them to effectuate these rights, to mitigate resi-
dents' isolation, and to work to improve the overall conditions 
within the nursing homes. 
Without the assistance of advocates, residents are often un-
aware either of their constitutional rights or the statutory fed-
eral patients' bill of rights12 which delineates fourteen basic 
rights of residents in nursing homes. All facilities which receive 
federal funds for patient reimbursement are required to abide 
by these enumerated rights. The patients' rights include free-
dom from mental and physical abuse, including chemical and 
physical restraint,13 the right to be treated with consideration 
and respect,14 the right to voice grievances to staff or outside 
representatives of their choice,15 the right to associate and com-
municate privately with persons of their choice, and the right to 
meet with community groups.16 
Residents also need advocates' help in asserting their rights 
and voicing grievances. Nursing home patients are difficult to or-
ganize because more than seventy percent are women,17 and as 
such have been acculturated not to be ·aggressive.1s The medical 
profession often views women patients as "silly, self-indulgent 
and superstitious" and regards women's ailments as "psychoso-
matic."19 Similarly, nursing home patients' complaints are writ-
12. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k) (1981). CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 22 R. 72527(a) (1982) 
contains all of the federal rights and articulates a few additional patient rights. 
13. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(7) (1981). 
14. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(9) (1981). 
15. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(5) (1981). 
16. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(1l), (12) (1981). 
17. See supra note 2. 
18. Interview with Katherine E. Meiss, Attorney, Western Center on Law and Pov· 
erty, Sacramento, Cal. (Aug. 27, 1982). 
19. B. EHRENREICH & D. ENGLISH, COMPLAINTS AND DISORDERS: THE SEXUAL POLITICS 
OF SICKNESS 79 (1973). 
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ten off as the ramblings of confused or senile persons. Both of 
these approaches not only discredit the individual to others, but 
make the individual doubt herself. Furthermore, both the nurs-
ing home patient fighting for her statutory rights and for better 
care, and the woman struggling for her autonomy and indepen-
dence in society are opposing the very institutions they depend 
upon.20 Armed both with knowledge of legal rights and with out-
siders to lend credibility to complaints, residents are better as-
sured of a response to their grievances and enforcement of their 
rights. 
Access also provides isolated residents with friendship: 
"[a]U people need love and attention to survive. For some people 
in nursing homes, volunteer programs provide the only avenue 
for concerned community members to demonstrate that nursing 
home residents are loved, and that others do care."21 Communi-
cation is difficult for the disabled, elderly patient on medica-
tions. Visitor groups are more likely to have the necessary time 
and patience for this communication than busy staff within the 
facility.22 The isolation of nursing home patients is aggravated 
by residents' lack of means of communicating with the outside 
world. Most residents do not have private televisions or tele-
phones; weakened eyesight may prevent them from reading 
newspapers and mail,23 or from writing letters. 
Communication needs to be assured. Where the 
rights of vulnerable, dependent people are at is-
sue, courts must be particularly alert to ef-
forts-from whatever source and for whatever 
motivation-to deprive such persons of whatever 
control they can retain over their own lives. 
Greater protection of human rights, and not less, 
20. "Our sheer physical dependence on medical technology makes the medical sys-
tem all the more powerful as a source of sexist ideology." [d. at 84. 
21. American Health Care Association, Establishing and Maintaining a Volunteer 
Program 3 (1976), quoted in Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6, Teitel-
baum v. Sorenson, No. 79-199 PHX WEC (D. Ariz. July 3, 1979) (order denying motion 
to dismiss and granting preliminary injunction), judgment entered, (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 
1979) (granting permanent injunction), appeal docketed, No. 793530 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 
1979) [hereinafter cited as Teitelbaum Motion for Preliminary Injunction] (organization 
wishing to explain a state income tax credit or refund to patients cannot be denied 
access). 
22. Interview with David Schulke, Director of United Neighbors in Action, (now de-
funct), Oakland, California (March 2, 1983). 
23. Teitelbaum Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 21, at 5-6. 
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is demanded of courts when vulnerable, depen-
dent persons' rights are at stake.24 
Finally, access is needed to ensure decent care in the facili-
ties. Residents are confronted with both a health care institu-
tion, the skilled nursing facility, which shows disregard for resi-
dents' health and safety, and a regulatory agency, such as 
California's Department of Health Services (DHS), that does lit-
tle to remedy abuses within the homes. Although there are nu-
merous federal and state codes which govern the quality of care 
to be administered in skilled nursing facilities,25 care remains 
24. 8rief of Amicus Curiae, National Citizens' Coalition for Nursing Home Reform, 
Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-respondent at 4, State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W. 2d 884 (Minn. 
1981) (daily visitor of brain-damaged nursing home resident cannot be convicted of tres-
pass since the guardians have implied consent by permitting access for 22 months). 
25. In California, the Department of Health Services (DHS) "is responsible for en-
suring that long-term care facilities provide adequate health care for California's chroni-
cally ill or convalescent patients .... According to department staff, as of March 1982, 
approximately 1,200 long-term care facilities provided care to approximately 106,000 pa-
tients. Through its Licensing and Certification Division ... the department enforces the 
minimum health standards specified in the California Health and Safety Code, in Title 
22 of the California Administrative Code (Title 22), and in Titles XVIII (Medicare) and 
XIX (Medicaid) of the Social Security Act. Through the Health Care Financing Admin-
istration, the federal government contracts with the State to certify health facilities for 
participation in the Medicare and Medi-Cal Program." AUDITOR GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES CAN IMPROVE THE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH CARE 
STANDARDS IN LONG-TERM CARE FACILITIES 1-2 (Aug. 1982) [hereinafter cited as AUDITOR 
GENERAL'S REPORT). See also CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 208(a), 1275 (West 1979) 
(the department can adopt and enforce rules and regulations to enable it to perform its 
duties). 
"The Department is required to conduct at least one annual inspection of each long-
term care facility to assess its compliance with state licensing and federal certification 
requirements for participation in the Medicare and Medi-Cal programs. In addition, the 
survey teams investigate complaints received by the district offices." AUDITOR GENERAL'S 
REPORT 2-3. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1422(b) (West Supp. 1984) (amend-
ing requirement: "conduct inspections annually, except with regard to facilities which 
have no Class A or Class 8 violations. . .. Every facility shall be inspected at least once 
every two years") and §§ 1419-21 (West 1979) (investigation of complaints). 
The DHS issues citations to facilities that do not comply with state and federal rules 
and regulations. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1423 (West Supp. 1984). There are three 
classifications of citations. Class "A" violations involve situations where there is either 
"imminent danger . . . or . . . substantial probability that death or serious physical 
harm to patients" will occur. Class "A" violations carry a civil penalty between $1,000 
and $5,000 "for each and every violation." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1424(a) (West 
Supp. 1984). Class "8" violations involve situations which have a "direct or immediate 
relationship to the health, safety, or security of long-term health care facility patients, 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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substandard.26 In California, DHS has demonstrated an unwill-
ingness to enforce the regulations by not uniformly applying the 
citation and fine system27 and by not trebling fines28 in the event 
other than Class "A" violations." The penalty for a "B" violation is between $50 and 
$250 "for each and every violation." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1424(b) (West Supp. 
1984). CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1427 (West 1979) and CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 
72701(a)(4) (1982) describe a "C" violation as one having "only a minimal relationship" 
to the safety or health of the patients. This type of violation carries no penalty. 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1426 (West 1979) authorizes the director of DHS to 
adopt regulations outlining the criteria and specific acts constituting Class "A" and Class 
"B" violations. 
26. AUDITOR GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 7. 
27. "[D)istrict offices issue different levels of citations and/or assess different fines 
for similar violations .... Consequently, a surveyor may assess an "A" violation for a 
case in which another department staff member may assess a "B" or "C" violation or no 
violation." [d. at 30. 
This lack of uniformity in citing is demonstrated in the case of Patient A, an 85 
year-old woman in a nursing home. A nurse attempted to administer medication to her, 
and A insisted that she was not taking any medication. The nurse refused to allow A to 
speak with her doctor and insisted that she take the pills. Finally, another nurse entered 
and discovered that the medication was intended for the roommate. Later that day, A 
wanted to speak with the administrator of the facility about the incident. She kept 
pressing her call bell. The nursing home responded by disconnecting the call bells be-
tween patient rooms and three nursing stations, thus affecting approximately 150 pa-
tients. Interview with Michael Zielinski, Organizer, United Neighbors in Action (July 15, 
1982). (This example and others in this Comment were taken from the files of United 
Neighbors in Action, Oakland, California, a former Bay Area community organization 
that handled complaints and sought to redress the problems of nursing home residents. 
To protect the privacy of patients and the anonymity of facilities, all references are de-
liberately obscure. Copies of fact sheets used in this Comment on file with Jaya 
Salzman.) 
By chance, the DHS arrived that day to conduct its inspection of the facility. They 
discovered the disconnected call bells and cited the facility with one "B" violation: 
"[f]ailure to maintain the audible signal between patient rooms and nursing stations has 
a direct and immediate relationship to the health and safety of all patients in the facil-
ity." United Neighbors in Action, Fact Sheet on Facility (compiled from facility records 
of violations, Department of Health Services, Berkeley, Cal.). 
Most such incidents of a short duration go undetected. A penalty of at most $250 for 
not being able to respond to 150 patients' pleas for immediate medical attention, bed 
pans, or help from sudden falls or other serious medical developments is more than leni-
ent. (See depositions below.) 
Moreover, an inadequate call bell system is an "A" violation. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
22, R. 72703(a)(7) (1982). Unauthorized administration of medication, such as was at-
tempted on Patient A is included in the list of both "A" and "B" violations. CAL. ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 22, R. 72703(a)(3) and R. 72705(a)(4) (1982). 
This incident can be contrasted with the following two depositions: 
Q: If an inspector . . . finds there is not an adequate emer-
gency call system, would that by itself be sufficient for issuing 
an "A" citation? 
A: ... [I)f it were the usual skilled nursing patient, bed pa-
tient, and it wasn't working, it would automatically be an "A" 
citation. 
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of recurrent violations.29 Because DHS is not enforcing the regu-
lations, nursing homes feel free to repeat infractions without 
penalty.30 Furthermore, two statutory measures in California re-
duce the punitive value of the fining system and allow nursing 
homes to continue violating the regulations. First, if nursing 
homes correct within a specified time the "B" violations-those 
violations that have a direct effect on patients' health or 
safety-they can avoid payment of the fines. 31 Second, since fa-
Deposition of Marian Vought (District A~ministrator, Berkeley Office, Dep't of Health) 
at 33-34, United Neighbors in Action v. Obledo, No. 495950-2 (Alameda County Super. 
Ct., Cal. filed June 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as United Neighbors in Action, Deposition 
of Marian Vought]. (The case was initiated against DHS for its lack of enforcement of 
the codes.) 
Q: [P]rior to the issuance of an "A" citation ... they would 
have to find if there were no call system operating, that that in 
fact endangered a patient's life? 
A: Yes ... I can't recall ever seeing it as a Class "A" cita-
tion. . . . If it is a person who is completely dependent. . . I 
think it automatically should be an "A" citation. 
Deposition of Charlene Harrington (Dec. 9, 1977) (former Deputy Director of the Dep't 
of Health Licensing and Certification Division) at 117, 120-22, United Neighbors in Ac-
tion v. Obledo, No. 495950-2 [hereinafter cited as United Neighbors in Action, Deposi-
tion of Charlene Harrington, Dec. 9, 1977]. 
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1428(e) (West Supp. 1984) requires the trebling 
of fines for violations repeated within twelve months. DHS does not enforce the regula-
tions in more than 75% of the cases involving repeat citations. AUDITOR GENERAL'S RE-
PORT, supra note 25, at 37. 
29. See supra note 25 for a description of the violation system. 
30. A: [T]here are very few "A" violations given, and really no 
penalties have ever been collected for "A" citations; so I think 
the deterrent effect for "A's" is almost nil. ... [T]he facilities 
know that before anything is going to be done, they have to be 
given a large number of citations, and they have to have seri-
ously repeated violations over quite a long history. 
Q: That. . . has led you to believe that ... that may be the 
reason for continued noncompliance by some of the facilities. 
A: Yes. 
United Neighbors in Action, Deposition of Charlene Harrington, Dec. 9, 1977, supra 
note 27, at 148-49. 
31. "Class 'B' violations ... have a direct or immediate relationship to the health, 
safety, or security of long-term health care facility patients .... If a Class 'B' violation 
is corrected within the time specified, no civil penalty shall be imposed unless it is a 
second or subsequent violation of the same regulation occurring. . . since the previous 
... inspection or 12 months, whichever is greater." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
1424(b) (West Supp. 1984). 
An example of how this section is abused is illustrated by Patient B, who was taken 
to a convalescent hospital to recuperate from a fractured hip. Her son observed that she 
developed a severe cough four days after admittance but the nursing home did not notify 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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cilities can appeal any citations they receive,32 inspectors Issue 
citations only when they have an "open and shut case."33 
Fighting to gain entrance to nursing homes can pressure the 
facilities to improve their overall conditions. Since facilities 
which deny access are often those that have something to hide,34 
gaining access may lead to discovery of substandard care. Be-
cause patients are dependent on the facility for assistance,31i lack 
financial resources,36 and are afraid of retaliation,37 outside ad-
the doctor, and that although she was given some fluids, she did not receive the assis-
tance she needed in drinking them. One week after admittance her son found her condi-
tion greatly deteriorated. She was pale, had trouble breathing, and did not recognize 
him. The staff seemed unconcerned with her condition, but he forced a nurse to call an 
ambulance. The hospital immediately put her on intravenous liquids due to her dehy-
drated condition, but she died the following day. Complaint letter from United Neigh-
bors to DHS Berkeley Office (Dec. 30, 1980). 
DHS found that the facility had not identified problems nor developed an individual 
plan of care for the patient. They found that the staff did not assist the patient with 
fluids nor notice her dehydration and decreased food intake. The staff also did not initi-
ate appropriate action on discovery of her serious condition. Department of Health, Li-
censing and Certification Division, Berkeley Office, Notice of Violations (Feb. 26, 1981). 
"It is an outrage that the facility was issued [two] "B" citations [with fines of $50 to 
$250] for infractions that led to the death of a patient .... A Class "A" violation is . 
[one] ... which presents an imminent danger ... or a substantial probability that 
death ... would result therefrom." The fines were retracted when the violations were 
"corrected." "[H]ow can they be corrected when my mother died directly from these 
violations?" Letter from Patient B's son to Department of Health (Nov. 23, 1981). 
32. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1428(a) (West Supp. 1984). 
33. Deposition of Charlene Harrington (Aug. 15, 1977) at 65, United Neighbors in 
Action v. Obledo, No. 495950-2. 
34. "[L]ack of regular visits by outsiders has been found by researchers to be di-
rectly correlated to poor quality of care rendered to residents." National Senior Citizens 
Law Center, Access to Facilities 1 (Jan. 1981) (paper written by staff, Washington, D.C.). 
35. One study found that 55% needed assistance in bathing, 47% with dressing, 
11 % with eating, and 33% were incontinent. Introductory Report, supra note 2, at 17. A 
later study's figures were higher: 86% needed help with bathing, 69% with dressing, 66% 
with walking, 33% with eating, 53% with using the bathroom, 45% were incontinent. 
1977 Survey, supra note 2, at 45. 
36. Seventy percent of nursing home residents have an income of less than $3,000 a 
year as opposed to less than 50 percent of the entire elderly population. VLADECK, supra 
note 1, at 14. 
37. Both patients and their relatives fear that their complaints to facilities or to 
California's DHS will result in retaliation against the patient. In a deposition regarding 
retaliation, an administrator of DHS stated that thOey look to see if "the person is dis-
charged from the facility or is asked to leave the facility. That is very easy to substanti-
ate. Those where there is [sic] complaints of ... withholding of food or not giving them 
sufficient amounts of food ... takes [sic] a great deal of investigation." United Neigh-
bors in Action, Deposition of Marian Vought, supra note 27, at 117-18. In another depo-
sition, the former Deputy Director of Licensing and Certification stated that she did not 
know of any substantiated cases of retaliation. She also stated that though the Depart-
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vocates can assist residents in filing complaints with the state 
regulatory agency, or can organize the residents into a cohesive 
group that can demand the care they deserve in the facility. 
ment was aware of a presumption of retaliation if a patient is moved within 120 days of 
filing a complaint; she did not think that any of the district offices applied that presump-
tion. United Neighbors in Action, Deposition of Charlene Harrington, Aug. 15, 1977, 
supra note 33, at 96-97. These depositions were taken subsequent to the following 
occurrence. 
Patient C, age 47, was paralyzed on one side from a stroke and was therefore unable 
to feed herself. She weighed 106 pounds when she entered the nursing horne. C's friends 
complained to the facility that she was not given sufficient food or water. When it ap· 
peared as though nothing had changed, the friends filed a complaint with DHS. At this 
inspection, three months after C entered the facility, the inspector stated that C was 
malnourished and estimated her weight at 75 pounds. The DHS report did not mention 
malnutrition, gave the facility a "C" violation, and no fine. The friends continued to 
make complaints. Soon after, when cysts were discovered on the patient, she was sent by 
ambulance to an acute care hospital for diagnosis. The hospital refused to admit her 
because she was not due to be evaluated for a week. Yet, on the same day, the nursing 
horne claimed that she could not return because the bed had been filled. 
The nurse at the emergency room told C's daughter that C should have been trans-
ferred, not discharged. The cysts were later found to be minor and had been present a 
long time. United Neighbors in Action Fact Sheets; interview with Elizabeth Hirshfeld, 
former Director of United Neighbors and present at the inspection of the facility (Oct. 5, 
1982). 
A complaint of retaliation was filed with DHS against the facility. CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 1432 (West 1979) states that: 
(a) No licensee shall discriminate or retaliate in any manner 
against a patient. . . on the basis. . . that such patient ... 
or any other person has initiated or participated in any pro-
ceeding specified in this chapter. A licensee who violates this 
section is subject to a civil penalty of no more than five hun-
dred dollars. . . . 
(b) Any attempt to expel a patient ... [who has filed a com-
plaint) or upon whose behalf a complaint has been submitted 
to the state department . . . within 120 days of the filing of 
the complaint or the institution of such action, shall raise a 
rebuttable presumption that such action was taken by the li-
censee in retaliation for the filing of the complaint. 
The physician in charge of the patient at the hospital told the DHS inspectors that 
he believed that C was "dumped" because of the controversy surrounding her care and 
that the cysts were used as an excuse to remove her. (Written statement by Davida E. 
Coady, M.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor at UCLA School of Public Health, for United 
Neighbors in Action, from a conversation with the physician in charge (March 18, 1977) 
(on file with Jaya Salzman). Dr. Coady also noted a marked increase in the weight of the 
patient after being out of the facility for two weeks.) The DHS could not substantiate 
the allegation of retaliation and stated that the doctor in charge at the hospital said "she 
had received excellent nursing care" at the Convalescent Hospital. Department of Health 
Memorandum from Alice Willis, Inspector, to Joan Dowling, Unit Supervisor, Berkeley 
Office (March 29, 1977). 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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Pressuring the facilities to improve the standard of care can pre-
vent the conditions from becoming worse as the population, and 
especially the elderly population, increases.38 
There are few reported cases39 involving community groups 
who have attempted to gain entrance to nursing homes. Of the 
unreported cases, some have involved out of court settlements,40 
some remain unreported,41 one involved a consent decree,42 one 
resulted in a dismissal,43 and one litigant decided to drop the 
suit when circumstances changed.44 Some advocates have pre-
ferred orchestrating the passage of strong access legislation in 
38. By the year 2030, it is estimated that with a general population growth of 40%, 
the elderly population will double to comprise 22% of the population and the number of 
people over 85 years will triple. These projections are from the 1977 census. U.S. Dep't of 
Health & Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration, Long Term Care: 
Background & Future Directions, HCFA 81-20047, 10 (Jan. 1981). Nursing home utiliza-
tion is predicted to grow 132% by that year. This is based solely on current age trends. 
It does not take other factors into consideration such as present discouragement of nurs-
ing home use or the prospect of fewer people to care for elderly relatives because of the 
increase of women in the work force. [d. at 12-13. 
39. State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W. 2d 884 (Minn. 1981); Fried v. Straussman, 41 N.Y. 2d 
376, 361 N.E. 2d 984, 393 N.Y.S. 2d 334 (1977) (nursing homes can deny doctor access 
without a hearing if the exclusion is made in good faith and is based on objectively rea-
sonable grounds). 
40. Citizens for Better Care v. Alden Care Enterprises, No. 72-214876 (Wayne 
County Cir. Ct., Mich. filed August 11, 1972) (advocate organization which reported inci-
dents of substandard care denied access to nursing home); Health Law Project v. Sarah 
Allen Nursing Home, No. 71-1795 (E.D. Pa. filed July 20, 1971) (stipulation entered Au-
gust 13, 1971) (advocate organization working to improve conditions in nursing homes 
denied access). Both cases were settled. Nursing Home Law Letter, Access to Nursing 
Homes 11 (March 1979) (available from Nat'l Senior Citizens Law Center, 1424 16th St. 
N.W., Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036). 
41. Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, No. 79-199 PHX WEC (D. Ariz. July 3, 1979); Cape 
Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose Rest Home, No. 81-1379 (1st Cir. Dec. 30, 
1981) (nursing home can deny access to organization wishing to inform patients of the 
legal services they can provide); Strickland v. Kempiners, No. 80-L-016025 (Cook County 
Cir. Ct., Ill. Feb. 20, 1981) (nursing home cannot deny access to organization that visits 
patients). 
42. Hudson v. McGee, No. 71778 F (Cir. Ct. St. Louis, Mo. 1977) (attorney cannot 
be prevented from meeting privately with a client in a nursing home). 
43. Frost v. Littleton House Nursing Home, No. 79-3082 (Super. Ct. Middlesex 
County, Mass. 1979) (former patient and friend of residents denied access to nursing 
home). The facility was successful in portraying the single individual desiring access as a 
troublemaker and thus preventing interference with their administration. Telephone in-
terview with Jack Fisher, Cambridge and Somerville Legal Services (Feb. 7, 1983). 
44. Legal Services Corp. of Iowa v. Bladister, Inc., Civ. No. 80-263-C (S.D. Iowa filed 
July 29, 1980) (legal services organization denied access to nursing home); telephone in-
terview with Wendy Geertz, Attorney for Plaintiff (Feb. 10, 1983). 
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their states rather than litigating on a case-by-case basis.·6 
Courts differ whether the right of the private property owner or 
of the individual resident should prevail, or which bases of liti-
gation can be successfully asserted in denial of access claims. 
This Comment explores the approaches to and legal issues in-
volved in the litigation of a denial of access complaint: as a vio-
lation of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and asso-
ciation in both federal and state courts; as a private right of 
action for violation of federal and state statutory rights of resi-
dents to receive visitors in private or meet in groups;·6 and as a 
breach of contract. All free people in this society have the right 
to meet with others of their choice. The elderly and the infirm 
should not be denied this right merely because they are con-
fined, perhaps permanently, in health care facilities. 
I. BASES OF LITIGATION 
A. RIGHTS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Nursing home residents and advocates have the right under 
the first amendment·7 to meet together and discuss the quality 
45. Telephone interview with Chuck Chomet, Citizens for Better Care, Detroit, 
Mich. (Oct. 5, 1982). For more details concerning benefits of legislative action see infra 
notes 151-63 and accompanying text. 
46. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(11), (12) (1981) provides: 
These patients' right policies and procedures ensure that, at 
least, each patient admitted to the facility: 
(11) may associate and communicate privately with per-
sons of his choice, and send and receive his personal 
mail unopened, unless medically contraindicated (as 
documented by his physician in his medical record); 
(12) may meet with, and participate in activities of, so-
cial, religious, and community groups at his discretion, 
unless medically contraindicated (as documented by his 
physician in his medical record); 
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 72527(a)(12), (13) (1982) contains nearly identical language. 
47. The first amendment states in full: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends these guarantees to 
state governments. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
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of patient care and how to improve conditions in the facilities. 
The first amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees citizens freedom of speech, peaceable assembly, and the au-
thority to petition the government for redress of grievances. 
These first amendment rights, which the United States Supreme 
Court has called "our most precious freedoms,"48 have also been 
held to include freedom of association.49 
Advocates who wish to inform nursing home patients of 
their constitutional and statutory rights are protected by the 
first amendment. The Supreme Court has ruled that freedom of 
association includes the right of attorneys to meet with people 
"who seek legal redress for infringement of their constitutionally 
guaranteed and other i-ights."60 Without the help of others, the 
resident will remain unaware of rights she should be able to 
assert. 
The freedoms under the first amendment are well-estab-
lished when the parties meet in public places.11l But when first 
amendment rights are abridged on private property, the plaintiff 
must establish that there wA.s state action62 for her claim to pre-
vail. The government cannot restrict the acts of private persons 
on private property unless the government is somehow a partici-
pant in the denial of constitutional rights. A party claiming de-
nial of first amendment rights is permitted to bring a suit into 
federal courts for injunctive relief or damages under 42 U.S.C. 
section 1983 if there has been a denial of constitutional "rights, 
§ 1. 
48. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (first amendment protects organiza-
tion which urged people to use their legal services to redress infringement of their consti-
tutional rights). 
49. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (action to require disclosure of 
membership lists infringes on plaintiff's freedom of association); Bates v. Little Rock, 
361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960) (action to require disclosure of membership lists is a denial 
of plaintiff's freedom of association); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960) (statute 
requiring teachers annually to file a list of all organizations they belong to or contributed 
to is a denial of freedom of association); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 452; Kusper v. 
Pontiker, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) (statute prohibiting voting in political party's pri-
mary if person has voted in primary of any other party within last two years infringes on 
freedom of association). 
50. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 428. 
51. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting all 
public meetings without a permit). 
52. See infra text accompanying notes 94-121 for a discussion of the state action 
requirement. 
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privileges, or immunities" under color of state law.1i3 
Although patients reside in nursing homes, most nursing 
homes 'are private property, and private property owners can re-
strict who may enter the premises.1I' Frequently, residents do 
not know that advocates wish to talk with them and so cannot 
invite them to visit. Even if patients do request an advocate to 
visit them, administrators sometimes deny them access. Al-
though individuals can be denied access to the private property 
of workplaces, apartment buildings, and shopping centers, those 
individuals can still leaflet or speak with people on the public 
sidewalks as they enter or leave the property. However, because· 
nursing home residents generally do not leave the facility, this 
alternative is not useful, and advocates may have no way to ap-
proach the residents other than to enter the facility. 
To assert the advocates' right of access on first amendment 
grounds, an analogy must be drawn between nursing homes and 
other situations where the courts have permitted people to enter 
private property to distribute information or communicate with 
people. A cause of action for infringement of the first amend-
ment in denial of access cases is important because, unlike other 
bases of litigation, the plaintiff can be either the resident or the 
advocate. Although residents may not know that an advocate 
was barred from the facility, the outsider who was denied en-
trance may still litigate the issue. This section explores how in 
53. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1981) provides in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation of any State. . . subjects or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be lia-
ble to the party injured . . . . 
The under color of state law requirement is discussed infra text accompanying notes 
94-121. 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981) permits the prevailing party in an action brought under § 
1983 to recover reasonable attorney's fees. 
54. "And it may well be that respondents' ownership of the property here in ques-
tion gives them various rights ... to limit the use of that property by members of the 
public in a manner that would not be permissible were the property owned by a munici· 
pality." Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 319 
(1968) (court permitted peaceful union picketing in a privately-owned shopping center). 
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similar situations courts have balanced the private property 
owners' interests against those of the individuals seeking access. 
The need to find state action in order that first amendment rem-
edies apply to the actions of private individuals is also discussed. 
1. The Balancing Test 
In cases which have involved access to private property, 
courts have used a balancing test to determine whether the own-
er's interests in privacy and freedom from intrusion are out-
weighed by the first amendment rights of communication. Ab-
sent alternative means of communication, peaceful speech and 
assembly have been permitted. Using this test, the Supreme 
Court has ruled in Martin v. City of Struthers that door-to-door 
solicitation is an exercise of first amendment rights and cannot 
be prohibited since homeowners have a less drastic alternative 
available to the denial of those rights. eili Although privacy might 
be disturbed by door-to-door solicitors, homeowners or apart-
ment building residents can easily end the communication by 
telling the solicitor that they are not interested, or by posting a 
no soliciting sign. 
A nursing home can be analogized to an apartment building; 
a nursing home patient can inform community people who come 
to her door that she does not wish to speak with them. Ci6 There is 
no need for the nursing home to protect all patients from an 
advocate who exercises reasonable care not to disturb sleeping or 
ill patients. Nursing home administrators should not be able to 
exercise this control on behalf of patients, since advocates who 
have spoken to residents have found many to be interested in 
receiving their help. Ci7 
55. 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
56. Recent access legislation permits community organizers and legal services per· 
sonnel to enter for other than commercial purposes. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. ll1-V2, § 4152-
110 (Smith-Hurd 1980). However, the question remains as to whether access can be con-
titutionally limited to particular kinds of people and particular kinds of speech. 
57. The out-of-court settlement in Citizens for Better Care v. Alden Care Enter-
prises, No. 72-214876 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich. filed August 11, 1972) involved 
visits to the eight facilities owned by defendant corporation by representatives of both 
parties. Fifty-four percent of the patients stated that they wanted a representative from 
Citizens for Better Care to visit them again. Telephone interview with Chuck Chomet, 
Citizens for Better Care, Detroit, Mich. (Oct. 5, 1982). 
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The Supreme Court decision in Marsh v. Alabama68 ex-
tended the balancing test articulated in Struthers to permit ac-
cess onto private property for the exercise of first amendment 
rights. The case involved the distribution of religious literature 
by a Jehovah's Witness on a sidewalk in a company-owned town. 
The Court found this town to be similar to all other towns in 
that "[ t] he property consists of residential buildings, streets, a 
system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' 
on which business places are situated," and that the public high-
way intersects the town, making it "accessible to and freely used 
by the public in general. "69 The Court balanced the right of the 
property owner to be free from intrusion against the first 
amendment rights of the residents of the town and found that 
"the latter occupy a preferred position."60 
Although this principle was extended to include shopping 
centers,61 it was cut back in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner62 and later 
[d. 
58. 326 u.s. 501 (1946). 
59. [d. at 502-3. 
60. [d. at 509. 
The court further stated that: 
In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the 
premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took 
place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to 
justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a com-
munity of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties 
and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a 
state statute. 
61. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. 308. 
We see no reason why access to a business district in a com-
pany town for the purpose of exercising First Amendment 
rights should be constitutionally required, while access for the 
same purpose to property functioning as a business district 
should be limited simply because the property surrounding 
the 'business district' is not under the same ownership. Here 
the roadways provided for vehicular movement within the 
mall and the sidewalks ... are the functional equivalents of 
the streets and sidewalks of a normal municipal business dis-
trict. The shopping center premises are open to the public to 
the same extent as the commercial center of a normal town. 
[d. at 319. 
62. 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (distribution of handbills protesting the Vietnam War in 
privately owned shopping center is unprotected by the first amendment since it is unre-
lated to mall activities and reasonable alternative means of communication exist). 
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overruled.63 Yet, the portion of the test in Lloyd which permits 
intrusion onto land if no "adequate alternative avenues of com-
munication exist"64 continues to be used.66 
Some courts have extended the principle established in 
Marsh to migrant labor camps. Of all the situations in which the 
courts have examined abridgement of first amendment rights, 
the migrant labor camp is the environment most similar to that 
of the nursing home. Both situations involve isolated groups of 
people who spend most or all of their time on the private prop-
erty of another; both involve isolated and impoverished minori-
ties unaware of their rights yet in need of attention; and both 
involve unsolicited outside groups wishing entry to help the peo-
ple. Therefore, a number of these decisions will be examined. 
The Fifth Circuit has stated that a labor camp is analogous 
to a company town because the property owner maintained a 
"self-contained community."66 In using the Lloyd test, the court 
found that there were no alternative avenues of communication 
available to organizers. The workers' biweekly trip to town was 
an inadequate alternative.67 The court therefore concluded that 
the organizers had a right of access based on the first amend-
ment which overrides the constitutional right of the property 
owner to keep people off his property. "[T]he mere fact that the 
owner has sequestered its employees from general intercourse 
with mankind can afford it no immunity from the prohibitions 
of the first amendment."68 
Other cases have reached the same result using the Marsh 
analogy. A New York county court found that the first amend-
ment prevailed although the right of access did not involve legal 
advocates or organizers, but a newspaper reporter.69 In another 
63. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (peaceful union picketing in privately 
owned shopping center not protected by first amendment). 
64. 407 U.S. at 567. 
65. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (first amendment rights of inmates are not 
violated in denying interviews with the press since alternative channels of communica-
tion are available); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (political candidates do not have 
a right to speak at Fort Dix since military personnel can attend political rallies off base). 
66. Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Co., 478 F.2d 73, 82 (5th Cir. 1973) (United Farm-
worker organizers and a minister have a right of access to a migrant labor camp). 
67. [d. 
68. [d. at 83. 
69. People v. Rewald, 65 Misc. 2d 453, 318 N.Y.S. 2d 40 (1971). 
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case, a New York district court held that although the camp 
contained only living quarters and a store, it bore "the 
hallmarks of a company town" and therefore the property owner 
had no constitutional right to restrict legal workers "unsolic-
ited" access to workers when there was no reasonable alternative 
to communication.70 Similarly, a district court in Michigan71 
stated that although the camps "are not exactly like the busi-
ness district of the company owned town in Marsh," the princi-
ple to be applied "is identical."72 "[T]he property rights of the 
camp owner do not include the right to deny access . . . to 
guests or persons working for any governmental or private 
agency whose primary objective is the health, welfare, or dig-
nity of the migrant workers as human beings."73 
In two migrant labor camp cases courts did not find a suffi-
cient similarity to the Marsh company town to permit access. 
The Seventh Circuit in Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell 
SOUp74 held that a labor camp was not analogous to a company 
town because people leave to get "goods and services typically 
obtainable in a small town."n In Asociacion de Trabajadores 
Agricolas v. Green Giant CO.,"76 the Third Circuit rejected the 
right of access because the plaintiff had documented neither the 
physical and psychological isolation of the people in the labor 
camps nor the unavailability of alternative means to communi-
cate with the workers.77 
Because the environment of nursing homes can be distin-
guished from that found in the camps in Campbell Soup and 
Green Giant, courts may be persuaded to permit access. Unlike 
70. MidHudson Legal Services v. G. & U., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 60, 61-62 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977) (emphases added). (Court granted legal services program access to camp to dis-
tribute booklet informing migrant workers of their rights and the right to assist in the 
assertion of those rights). 
71. Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (organizers trying to 
assist migrant workers residing at a labor camp cannot be denied access). 
72. [d. at 623. 
73. [d. at 624 (emphasis added). 
74. 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978). 
75. [d. at 378. 
76. 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975). 
77. [d. at 138. 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss3/13
1984] ACCESS TO NURSING HOMES 725 
the migrant camp in Campbell Soup, a nursing home supplies 
most of the goods and services the resident receives. The facility 
provides residents with room and board, medical attention, 
laundry services, physical therapy, and occasional recreational 
activities. If the supplies or medications that a patient needs are 
not available on the premises, the facility typically arranges to 
bring them to the patient. Further, in contrast to the reasoning 
in Green Giant, nursing home patients are isolated and do not 
leave the facility; advocates have no alternative means of com-
municating with them. 
In two unpublished nursing home access cases, the courts 
examined the analogy to migrant labor camps and reached op-
posite findings. 7s In the first case, Teitelbaum u. Sorenson,79 the 
District Court in Arizona determined that a nursing home is the 
"functional equivalent" of a town because a nursing home in-
cludes "all the components of a town." The court stated that 
"since the facility provides all necessary services to the residents 
and they are physically and psychologically confined and iso-
lated from other community activities,"so access may not be de-
nied to a local organization. 
In contrast, the First Circuit Court in Cape Cod Nursing 
Home Council u. Rambling Rose Rest HomeS1 denied the plain-
tiffs access to the facility. The court found three ways the rest 
home differed from the Marsh company town. First, the court 
determined that a rest home lacked the "residential buildings, 
streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'busi-
ness block'" that the Supreme Court had found present in the 
Marsh company town.S2 Instead of examining ways in which a 
facility is a "self-contained community,"S3 the court concen-
trated on the physical attributes outlined in Marsh. Second, the 
78. Although the court3 discussed the Marsh analogy to examine whether there was 
state action, that information is included within the discussion of first amendment bal-
ancing. The court3 overlapped the issues of whether the nursing home is sufficiently like 
the Marsh company town to fulfill the state action requirement, with whether the pri-
vate property is sufficiently a complete community and the patient3 are so isolated by 
their environment that the advoc'ates have no alternative means to communicate with 
them. 
79. No. 79-199 PHX WEC (D. Ariz. July 3, 1979). 
80. Id. slip op. at 5. 
81. No. 81-1379 (1st Cir. Dec. 30, 1981). 
82. Id. slip op. at 3; see also Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502. 
83. Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Co., 478 F.2d at 82. 
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court found that a rest home is not freely accessible to the pub-
lic as is a company town located next to a public highway.84 The 
court failed to consider that during visiting hours a rest home is 
accessible to portions of the public. Third, the court found that 
the owner of the rest home was not "performing the full spec-
trum of municipal powers" such as "operat[ing] utilities or their 
own police or fire protection services" as did the company town 
in Marsh.8r> The court failed to consider that, like a migrant 
camp, the rest home pays the city and its agencies to provide 
full services for this total community within a city. 
Relying on the two migrant labor camp decisions that de-
nied access, Campbell SOUp86 and Green Giant,87 the court de-
nied access and concluded that advocates could utilize other 
means to communicate with residents in the facility: letters, 
telephone calls, or requests by residents for the plaintiffs to visit 
them at specific times during visiting hours.88 This holding dif-
fers in principle from Marsh and the migrant labor camp deci-
sions. In those cases, uninvited people could enter to communi-
cate with residents. They neither had to know specific names of 
residents, nor rely on the inhabitants' previous knowledge of the 
group's existence. Yet, such information is necessary for advo-
cates to utilize these alternative means of communication in 
nursing homes. By failing to recognize the complete isolation of 
residents and by suggesting impracticable alternative means of 
communication, the court in Cape Cod denied residents and ad-
vocates their constitutional rights of freedom of speech and 
association. 
In the balancing analysis which weighs the nursing home's 
interests against those of residents and advocates, the court in 
Cape Cod was persuaded that visits by members of an advocacy 
organization would "threaten patient care and pose significant 
risks to the elderly residents."89 Although residents in a rest 
84. Cape Cod, No. 81-1379, slip op. at 3 (1st Cir. Dec. 30, 1981). 
85. [d. at 4 . 
. 86. 574 F.2d 374. 
87. 518 F.2d 130. 
88. Cape Cod, No. 81-1379, slip op. at 5 (1st Cir. Dec. 30, 1981). 
89. [d. at 6-7. 
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home require a lower level of care than residents in a nursing 
home, the facility was successful in asserting its alleged interests 
in minimizing disturbance to patients and in protecting patients 
from unwanted visitors. Since the patients are legally entitled to 
voice grievances,9o and are permitted visitors during visiting 
hours, another's assistance in exercising the right to complain or 
informing the patients of their rights should not be considered a 
disturbance. Furthermore, the patient, not the facility, should 
determine whether an advocate is unwanted.9} "Although pa-
tients at the facility may at times become confused or may not 
be entirely functional, they may still benefit greatly from visita-
tion .... These patients have the greatest need for outside ad-
vocates .... "92 The court in Cape Cod did not permit the resi-
dents to determine for themselves whether they wanted to 
exercise their right to freely associate with the advocacy 
organization. 
Since few cases exist in the area of nursing home access, one 
cannot predict whether courts will be swayed by arguments such 
as those offered by the rest home in Cape Cod. The plaintiff's 
success in Teitelbaum can be partially attributed to the empha-
sis on educating the trier of fact. Numerous expert witnesses and 
other witnesses were introduced to dispel myths about the eld-
erly in nursing homes and to help the judge understand the im-
portance of and difficulties in communication for the elderly. 
Using both this information and the analogy to migrant camps, 
the court weighed the interests in favor of residents' and advo-
cates' freedom of speech and association to permit access.93 
2. Finding State Action 
Because the government generally does not restrict the ac-
tions of private parties on private property, before a plaintiff can 
90. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1l21(k)(5) (1982) states in pertinent part that a patient "may 
voice grievances and recommend changes ... to facility staff and/or to outside repre-
sentatives of his choice .... " CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 72527(a)(6) (1982) contains 
nearly identical wording. 
91. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
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bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging denial of 
freedom of speech and association, she or he must show that the 
defendant acted under color of state law. The United States Su-
preme Court has ruled that the under color of state law require-
ment is synonymous with state action.94 If the deprivation of 
first amendment rights resulted from actions of a federal or state 
governmental agency, the state action requirements is automati-
cally met. Since nursing homes are privately owned, the plaintiff 
must make the more difficult showing that defendant's actions 
are sufficiently connected to the state's so that they can be 
treated as the actions of the state itself. Three methods of find-
ing state action to assert a claim of denial of access are ex-
amined below.95 
a. Public Function Test 
One method of finding state action is through application of 
the public function test-whether the private entity exercised 
"powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."96 The 
United States Supreme Court in Blum v. Yaretsky 97 held that 
nursing homes do not "perform a function that has been 'tradi-
tionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.' "98 Because the 
Court did not find state action, the nursing home in Blum was 
permitted to discharge or transfer Medicaid patients to lower 
94. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,794-95 n.7 (1966) (private persons who ac-
ted jointly with state officials in releasing prisoners from jail then intercepting and kill-
ing them are acting under color of law). 
95. No simple test exists for finding sk~e action. "Formulating an infallible test" of 
state action "is an impossible task." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967) (voters' 
proposition permitting property owners to discriminate in who they sell or lease to is 
state action). "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious in-
volvement of the state in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (court found that because res-
taurant that racially discriminates was on public property, there was state action). 
96. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (no state action for 
state-regulated private utility company to terminate service to customer in arrears). 
97. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
98. [d. at 1011; see also Bladister, Civ. No. 80-263-C (S.D. Iowa filed July 29, 1980), 
First Court Order at 7 (Nov. 18, 1980); Fuzie v. Manor Care, 461 F. Supp. 689, 695 (N.D. 
Ohio, 1977) (transfer or discharge of Medicaid patients by nursing home does not meet 
state action requirement). 
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levels of care without a hearing. The Court held that although 
the state must "provide funds for the care of the needy," the 
state is not required to provide any particular type of care, 
"much less long-term nursing care."99 Also, although states must 
fund nursing homes to receive federal funds from Medicaid, the 
statute "does not require that the States provide the services 
themselves. "100 
The Court in Blum did not examine the approach to the 
public function test enunciated in Marsh v. Alabama,lol where 
the Court found state action because the privately-owned town 
was the functional equivalent of a sovereignty. This analysis has 
been expanded 102 to include migrant labor camps and, in Teitel-
baum v. Sorenson,103 a nursing home. In his dissent in Blum, 
Justice Brennan stated that nursing homes meet the state action 
test because they are equivalent to a Marsh company town.104 
Thus, the Marsh analysis is useful for both first amendment and 
state action analyses. Because the Blum majority did not ex-
amine the Marsh approach to the public function test, it ap-
pears that the Court no longer utilizes this analysis. The Court 
now seems unwilling to extend the meaning of public function. 
Nevertheless, Marsh, the migrant labor camp cases, and nursing 
home access cases all involve denial of first amendment rights 
and thus differ from Blum. Because the Court generally safe-
guards this important freedom, it may be more willing to use the 
Marsh company town analysis to find state action in denial of 
access cases. 
b. Nexus Test 
A second state action test was enunciated in Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co. 1011 where the Court stated that there 
must be "a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the 
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of 
99. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011. 
100. Id. 
101. 326 U.S. 501. 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 66-88. 
103. No. 79-199 PHX WEe (D. Ariz. July 3, 1979). 
104. 457 U.S. at 1028. 
105. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
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the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. "106 In 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,t07 the Court found 
state action in the interdependent relationship between the state 
and a restaurant on public property. The Court termed it a rela-
tionship of mutual benefits because the state received funds 
from the leased property and the restaurant received convenient 
parking and maintenance of the building from the state.106 The 
Court ruled that the state was a "joint participant in the chal-
lenged activity."109 Since Burton, however, the Court has re-
quired more of a showing to find state action. The Court in 
Blum determined that the combination of government regula-
tion and government subsidy is insufficient to find state ac-
tion.110 Similarly, although the Court in Burton held that the 
state's inaction was sufficient to find state action, 111 Blum stated 
that the state must be "responsible for the specific conduct of 
which the plaintiff complains."l12 The Blum court held that it is 
still possible to find state action with this test if "the challenged 
conduct consists of enforcement of state laws or regulations by 
state officials who are themselves parties in the lawsuit. "113 Only 
if the state enacts a statute which prohibits access will the advo-
cate be assured of finding state action under this test in a denial 
of access case. 
106. Id. at 351. 
107. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
108. Id. at 723-24. 
109. Id. at 725. 
110. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 
350) stated that "[t]he mere fact that a business is subj~ct to state regulation does not 
by itself convert its action into that of the State." See also Fuzie v. Manor Care, 461 F. 
Supp. at 695; Fried v. Straussman, 41 N.Y.2d 376, 379, 361 N.E.2d 984, 986, 393 N.Y.S. 
2d 334, 336 (1977) (doctor denied access to a nursing home). 
111. 365 U.S. at 725. 
112. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004. The court in Blum did not find that the state was 
responsible for the decision to transfer patients and, therefore, found no state action. Id. 
at 1005-12. 
113. Id. at 1004. 
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c. State Authorization or Encouragement Test 
The third state action test considers whether the state has, 
by its actions, encouraged or affirmatively approved of the ac-
tions of the private entity.la This can occur when the state has 
become so involved in the deprivation of rights that it has sanc-
tioned them. lUI In Blum, the Supreme Court stated that "a State 
normally can be held responsible for a private decision only 
when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such signif-
icant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must 
in law be deemed to be that of the State."us The Blum court 
further stated that "[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the 
initiatives of a private party" would not lead to a finding of state 
action.117 The Court did not elaborate on what this phrase 
meant, but used it to find that no state action was involved in 
the transfer plan arranged by the doctors. 
Under this theory, a finding of state action can be argued 
from the state's encouragement in two California denial of ac-
cess incidents. us Although the state enforcement agency knew of 
114. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978) (warehouseperson's proposed 
sale of goods to satisfy lien is not state action since resolution of private disputes is not 
exclusively reserved to the state and the state merely acquiesced to the private action, it 
did not affirmatively authorize or encourage it). 
115. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 19-20 (1948) (state action if state court enforces 
racially restrictive covenant); Reitman v. Mulkey,387 U.S. 369, 375-79 (1967) (state ac-
tion for voters to overturn legislation and thereby constitutionally permit racial discrimi-
nation in the sale or leasing of real property). 
116. 457 U.S. at 1004. 
117. [d. 
118. Two organizers visited patients at Facility A to inform them of their rights. 
Previous to this, the advocates had filed complaints against this facility because of poor 
patient care. The organizers were forced to leave with a police escort. (Letters of com-
plaint from Sheila Mason, Organizer, United Neighbors in Action to DHS (September 
25, 1981 and November 6, 1981». DHS replied three months after a complaint was filed. 
The complaint had included a signed letter from a resident stating she wanted members 
of the organization to continue to visit her. DHS stated that they were unable "to re-
solve" the complaint since "[olther advocacy groups ... do not have a problem with 
such confrontations," and since the facility stated that "the patients are not mentally 
responsible." They stated that they would only take action if "there is a definite depriva-
tion of patients' rights" and that the organization should seek "legal processes." Letter 
from Donald Dunn, District Administrator of the Berkeley Office of Department of 
Health Services to United Neighbors in Action (December 21, 1981). 
The Health Department believed the facility's claim of residents who were mentally 
unfit and therefore unable to decide for themselves. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 
72527(a)(12), (13) (1982) permits patients to meet with others or in groups unless "medi-
cally contraindicated." There is no evidence here to show that was the case. Also, CAL. 
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the incidents from complaints, and verified the occurrences in 
its investigations, it failed to take any action on these violations 
of the patients' bill of rights.1l9 It can be argued that the state 
agency was not merely acquiescing to the nursing home's rules 
since the agency had an affirmative duty to act on the com-
plaints. By ign~ring violations of which it was aware, the state 
encouraged the nursing homes to continue to deny access. 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has made the state action 
test almost impossible to meet under any of these theories. 
Without state action, a resident's first amendment right to asso-
ciate with advocates cannot be asserted. Fortunately, on occa-
sion, the Supreme Court has responded to a violation of impor-
tant rights or the need to protect a select group of people and 
has expanded theories to protect these interests. The develop-
ment of state action theories as a means to prohibit racial dis-
crimination is a prime example.120 Because of the Court's inter-
est in safeguarding first amendment rights and because of the 
total isolation of nursing home 'residents when access is denied, 
the Court might be persuaded to find state action in a denial of 
access complaint. Perhaps the original Marsh public function 
test will be revived to show that the nursing home is a total 
community segregated from the world. Possibly a state's encour-
ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 72527(c) (1982) states that only (a)(l) through (4) of the Pa-
tients' Bill of Rights devolves to the next of kin and this is only when the patient has 
been judged legally incompetent. 
At Facility B an attorney and an organizer attempted to visit patients to inform 
them of their legal rights. Previous complaints about violations in this facility had been 
filed. A staff person followed them around and snapped photographs of their conversa-
tions with residents. During their conversations, residents said that they would like to 
have them visit again. When the police arrived to answer a call of trespass, the two 
voluntarily left. (Declaration of Lucy Fitzpatrick, Attorney, Senior Adults Legal Assis-
tance (SALA), Palo Alto, Cal., November 1981) (on file with Jaya Salzman). Eight 
months after receiving the initial complaint, DHS determined that because "the incident 
does not represent a 'practice' of the facility which would cause a patient to forego exer-
cising his or her rights because of fear of retaliation," they could not construe it as a 
violation. Letter from Paul Gould, District Administrator, DHS to United Neighbors in 
Action (June 11, 1982). 
119. Patients are permitted to meet with visitors of the patient's choice or in groups. 
42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(1l), (12) (1981); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 72527(a)(12), (13) 
(1982). 
120. See, e.g" Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715; Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1; Reitman v. Mulkey 387 U.S. 369. 
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agement in incidents such as those in California121 could also in-
voke a finding of state action. Without such a showing, nursing 
home residents are prevented from exercising their first amend-
ment rights to demand quality care. Thus, they may spend the 
remainder of their days isolated in a substandard, yet state and 
federally funded and regulated, facility. 
B. RIGHTS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION 
A state can provide greater protection of individual rights 
under its constitution than the minimum standards set by the 
United States Constitution.122 Because California has done this 
with freedom of speech, nursing home residents and advocates 
are likely to prevail in a denial of access complaint. In most 
states, to assert a freedom of speech violation under the state 
constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate state action. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping 
Center,123 held that a finding of state action was not necessary 
because article I, section 2 of the state constitution124 is signifi-
cantly broader in scope than the first amendment. Free speech 
rights are protected against the actions of private parties if the 
private property is open to the public. In balancing the private 
property owner's rights against the plaintiff's first amendment 
rights, the court stated that the protection of citizens' freedom 
of speech and right to petition is an important state interest and 
justifies "reasonable restrictions on private property rights."125 
Although nursing homes are not open to the public to the 
same extent as shopping centers, they do have general visiting 
hours. Thus, a denial of access claim in the California courts 
121. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
122. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (search of impounded vehicle con-
stitutional under the fourth amendment); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (state may enact statute to protect free speech at privately-owned 
shopping center). 
123. 23 .Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
Pruneyard involved two high school students who circulated a petition at a shopping 
mall protesting the United Nations' resolution againt Zionism. The shopping center, 
which had a no-soliciting rule, forced the plaintiffs to leave. The California Supreme 
Court held that the plaintiffs' free speech rights could not be prohibited at a shopping 
mall open to the public. 
124. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a) provides in pertinent part: "[e]very person may freely 
speak ... his or her own sentiments on all subjects .... " 
125. 23 Cal. 3d at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859. 
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probably will have the same outcome as Pruneyard: the plain-
tiffs' rights to communicate with others will be upheld. Permit-
ting access to nursing homes by advocates during visiting hours 
is the type of reasonable restriction on private property rights 
that the court in Pruneyard allows. 
At this time, when the United States Supreme Court is cut-
ting back on parties' ability to assert state action, Pruneyard is 
invaluable. Advocates and residents in nursing homes can find 
protection of their right to meet within the facility. 
C. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF THE MEDICAID 
ACT 
When a nursing home resident cannot meet and communi-
cate with members of a community organization, she can assert 
a claim for violation of the Medicaid Act.126 The patients' bill of 
rights, a part of this federal statute, gives residents the right to 
meet with individuals and groups of their choice.127 Although 
neither resident nor advocate can communicate when access is 
denied, only the resident can be a plaintiff to the action. The 
federal regulations were enacted to outline the care to be admin-
istered to patients, therefore when there is a violation of the 
statute, the patient is the injured party. 
In order to seek relief for a violation of a federal statute, an 
individual must either be given express authority in the statute 
to sue for enforcement and damages, or a private right of action 
must be implied under the statute.128 No express right for a pri-
vate cause of action exists in the Medicaid statute.129 The Su-
preme Court in Cort v. Ash130 examined the following four fac-
126. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396n (1976 & Supp. v 
1981). 
127. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(1l), (12) (1981). 
128. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (stockholder's derivative suit cannot be im-
plied under the criminal statute prohibiting corporate expenditures in presidential 
elections). 
129. Roberson v. Wood, 464 F. Supp. 983, 988 (E.D. Ill. 1979) (patients in nursing 
home have implied cause of action under the Medicaid Act). 
130. 422 U.S. 66. 
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tors to be used to determine if such a cause of action could be 
implied: 
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose 
especial benefit the statute was enacted" ... ? 
Second, is there any indication of legislative in-
tent, either explicit or implicit, either to create 
such a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the 
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the 
plaintiff? ... And finally, is the cause of action 
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area 
basically the concern of the states so that it would 
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based 
solely on federal law?131 
Three cases have examined whether the Medicaid statute 
implies a private right of action for nursing home residents. Dis-
trict courts in New Hampshire and Illinois found that the stat-
ute did; a district court in Ohio reached the opposite conclusion. 
The unpublished New Hampshire decision132 did not use 
the four-prong Cort test. Relying on another Supreme Court 
holding,133 the court found that absent a mechanism for nursing 
home patients to obtain relief, federal courts must adjudicate 
their claims. The plaintiffs were entitled to a hearing before 
transfer from a facility. 
The Illinois decision, Roberson v. WOOd/ 34 involved the 
transfer of patients without the adequate notice or hearing 
plaintiffs asserted were required by the Medicaid statute. Using 
the Cort test, the district court found first that the statute was 
created for the benefit of these patients since safeguards for pa-
tients' care and services must be provided.131i Second, the court 
found that there was a legislative intent to create a private rem-
edy because the only enforcement remedy provided by Medicaid 
IS the withholding of funds if facilities are not in compliance 
131. [d. at 78. 
132. Berry v. First Healthcare Corp., MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 11 28,693 
(D.N.H. Oct. 26, 1977). 
133. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406 n.8 (1970). 
134. 464 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ill. 1979). 
135. [d. at 988. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1974). 
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with the law. This exclusive remedy does not protect the inter-
ests of patients. Third, the private remedy therefore is consis-
tent with the purpose of the legislation: no one else can protect 
the patients' rights. ls6 Finally, since Medicaid is purely a federal 
statute, litigation is appropriate in federal court.IS7 
The contrary Ohio decision, Fuzie v. Manor Care/ S8 also in-
volved a patient who asserted that her transfer from the nursing 
home was illegal. The court examined the Cart four-prong test 
and determined that the Medicaid statute was not intended as a 
private remedy. The court stated that the first factor was not 
met because the plaintiff did not have an absolute right not to 
be transferred. 139 One commentator, Butler, has refuted this ar-
gument. "Whether there is an absolute right to any benefits 
under Medicaid is irrelevant to determining whether the statute 
was created for the benefit of recipient plaintiffs; such a ques-
tion relates, if at all, to [the] ultimate remedy, not to whether a 
claim is stated."140 Under the second prong of the Cart test, the 
court held that the legislature did not intend to create such a 
remedy. Medicaid, unlike Medicare, provided for administrative 
enforcement but no judicial review. l • l According to Butler, this 
is an incorrect examination of the statute. While Medicare is an 
exclusive federal program with specifically defined terms, Medi-
caid allows states to develop their own programs under the fed-
eral guidelines. Not only had courts permitted beneficiaries to 
sue states for violations of the program for more than ten years, 
but Congress had "implicitly acquiesced in these judicial deci-
sions."142 This demonstrates legislative intent for a private cause 
of action. l • s In examining the third prong, the Ohio court held 
136. "[W]here the agency has not provided a mechanism by which recipients can 
. obtain relief, there is no basis for the refusal of federal courts to adjudicate the merits of 
these claims." Roberson v. Wood, 464 F. Supp. at 989. See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 
U.S. at 406 n.8. 
137. Roberson v. Wood, 464 F. Supp. at 988-89. 
138. 461 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ohio 1977). 
139. [d. at 696. 
140. Butler, A Long-Term Health Care Strategy for Legal Services, 14 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 613, 651 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Butler, Health Care Strategy]. 
141. Fuzie, 461 F. Supp. at 696-97. 
142. Butler, Health Care Strategy, supra note 140, at 652. 
143. [d. 
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that a private cause of action by the patient was inconsistent 
with the purpose of the legislation. The court stated that a pri-
vate remedy would "disrupt" the program's implementation.H • 
Butler disagreed. She cited a congressional report which sug-
gested enforcement by beneficiaries of the program because 
states fail to monitor nursing home compliance.l4II The court 
held that because plaintiff's cause of action should be adjudi-
cated in state court and not federal court, the fourth prong of 
the test was not met. The court stated that the plaintiff was a 
third -party beneficiary of the provider agreement between the 
nursing home and the state, and that actions for breach of con-
tract belong in the state court.U6 Butler countered the court's 
argument, stating that "[c]ontracts based exclusively on federal 
statutes should provide federal claims."147 
Denial of access to nursing homes can also be analyzed 
under the four-prong Cort test. Although the courts differed on 
whether patients have an implied private right of action in 
transfer cases, results in denial of access cases are likely to be 
more successful. Under the first prong, the patients' bill of rights 
certainly was created for the especial benefit of residents. For 
the second and third prongs, whether a court will use the analy-
sis in Roberson rather than that in Fuzie is only conjecture. Be-
cause state regulatory agencies have demonstrated their unwill-
ingness to enforce the provisions of the federal statute that 
permit residents to meet with visitors of their choice or in 
groups,148 the plaintiffs can argue that allowing a private right of 
action not only protects patients' rights, but also will result in 
compliance with this provision of the Medicaid Act-certainly 
the legislators' intent in enacting the Medicaid Act. Under the 
fourth prong, although states must enforce the Medicaid provi-
sions, litigation of a federal statute is appropriate in federal 
court. 
An alternative method of asserting a cause of action for vio-
144. Fuzie, 461 F. Supp. at 697. 
145. Butler, Health Care Strategy, supra note 140, at 652. 
146. Fuzie, 461 F. Supp at 697. 
147. Butler, Health Care Strategy, supra note 140, at 652. 
148. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(11), (12) (1981); see supra notes 118-19 and accompa-
nying text for examples of how the California DHS did not enforce these statutory 
provisions. 
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lation of this federal statute exists. The Supreme Court has held 
that a party can apply 42 U.S.C. section 1983 to assert a private 
claim for a violation of a federal statute, since section 1983 per-
mits a cause of action for deprivation of rights under both the 
Constitution. and laws of the United States.149 Again, to be suc-
cessful with this claim, state action must be shown. 
In conclusion, although the federal patients' bill of rights 
authorizes access, I~O a nursing home patient may be unable to 
prevent deprivation of her rights. Before a court will rule on the 
issue, the patient must demonstrate her right to assert a viola-
tion of a statute. Results under either the Cort four-prong test, 
or with state action for a violation of section 1983 are uncertain. 
Further, as the nursing home patient may not know her rights 
and may be afraid or unable to assert them without an outsider's 
help, the limitation on potential plaintiffs may effectively pre-
vent both access and the resultant communication between pa-
tient and advocate. Courts have placed a possible legal barrier in 
the way of a patient resolving a denial of her statutory rights. 
Hopefully, courts will be persuaded to find a private right of ac-
tion under the Medicaid Act with a strong showing that access is 
not only an important patient's right, but also a means both to 
alleviate the despair of the isolated, incarcerated elderly and to 
implement quality patient care. 
D. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF STATE STATUTES 
Passage of state regulations that both carefully enunciate 
the types of community organizations that can demand access, 
and provide an express private right of action for violations of 
the statute, may prove to be the most effective means of assur-
ing advocates a right to enter and meet with residents of nursing 
homes. The current federal regulations permit access but do not 
say who can be admitted. Nursing homes are quick to assert that 
the statutes should permit entrance to visiting friends and rela-
149. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (section 1983 encompasses claims based 
on statutory violations of federal law; plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees for success-
fully asserting deprivation of Social Security welfare benefits). 
150. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(1l), (12) (1981). 
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tives, but not to organizations that do not know individual resi-
dents. Providing an express right of access to advocates and a 
means of enforcing the regulation can prove less difficult and 
costly than asserting constitutional violations or violations of the 
federal Medicaid Act. 
Until recently, residents in California nursing homes had a 
limited remedy for fighting nursing home violations in the state 
courts. The California Health and Safety Code permits a patient 
to assert a cause of action for injunction or damages if the facil-
ity has committed either an "A" type violation (imminent dan-
ger or substantial probability of death or serious harm) or "B" 
type violation (direct effect on patients' health or safety) unless 
the violation has been corrected. 11I1 This private remedy has a 
number of disadvantages. First, DHS must cite a facility for an 
"A" or "B" type violation, which DHS is reluctant to do.l52 Sec-
ond, recovery is limited to the maximum amount of the penalty 
that can be assessed. The maximum penalty is $5,000 for an "A" 
violation and $250 for a "B" violation. Because few "A" viola-
tions are issued, and because "B" violations result in such small 
recoveries, few patients have been motivated to bring lawsuits. 11I3 
On September 27, 1982, former Governor Brown approved 
subsection (b) as an amendment to section 1430 of the Califor-
nia Health and Safety Code, which gives a patient a private 
right of action to bring a civil suit against a nursing home if the 
California patients' bill of rightsl1l4 has been violated. l5Ci The 
151. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1430(a) (West Supp. 1984) reads: 
Any licensee who commits a class "A" or "B" violation may be 
enjoined from permitting the violation to continue or may be 
sued for civil damages. . . by any person acting for the inter-
ests of itself. The amount of civil damages which may be re-
covered . . . shall not exceed the maximum amount of civil 
penalties which could be assessed on account of the violation 
or violations. 
152. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text. 
153. Letter from Standing Committee on Legal Problems of Aging of the Legal Ser-
vices Section of the State Bar of California to State Senator Petris (April 13, 1982) (dis-
cussing the advantages to an amendment to Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1430). 
154. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 72527 (1982). 
155. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1430(b) (West Supp. 1984) states: 
A resident or patient. . . may bring a civil action against any 
licensee. . . who violates any rights of the resident or patient 
as set forth in the Patients Bill of Rights in Section 72527 of 
Title 22 of the California Administrative Code .... The li-
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plaintiff can receive up to $500 in damages, costs and attorney 
fees, Hi6 and injunctive relief. If a nursing home stops a resident 
from meeting privately with individuals or community groups,!117 
a patient can receive damages for violation of her rights and for 
injunctive relief. The drawback to this new law is that only a 
patient can assert that her right to meet with an advocate has 
been violated,158 and the amount of damages is small.11l9 Also, 
the definition of access has not been clarified to show that com-
munity groups that do not know specific residents have an ex-
press right of entry. 
Other states have enacted regulations specifically to prevent 
denial of access. A Washington, D.C. regulation provides access 
to members of community organizations and legal services pro-
grams, enumerates what these community people can do in the 
nursing homes, and provides enforcement remedies for both res-
idents and advocates.16o Better results are assured when a denial 
censee shall be liable for up to five hundred dollars ($500), 
and for costs and attorney fees, and may be enjoined from 
permitting the violation to continue . . . . 
156. Attorney fees do not need to be commensurate with the amount of the award of 
damages, nor must the party prevail on all claims. In Rivera v. City of Riverside, 679 
F.2d 795 (1982), the judgment for the plaintiff was $33,350 and the award of attorney 
fees was $243,344. (Police broke up the party plaintiff was attending with tear gas and 
unnecessary physical force. The jury found for the plaintiff on negligence, false arrest, 
false imprisonment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 charges.) 
157. CAL. ADMIN CODE tit. 22, R. 72527(a)(12), (13) (1982) includes these as patient 
rights. 
158. See supra note 155. 
159. Senate Bill 1930, which became the Health and Safety Code §1430(b), was ini-
tially stronger. It provided for damages of up to $2,500 and punitive damages. The Cali-
fornia Association of Health Facilities (CAHF) is an organization made up of the for-
profit nursing home corporations. CAHF is well-organized and maintains a lobbyist in 
Sacramento. The bill was weakened because of organized pressure from the industry. 
Nursing home reform organizations, after having seen many excellent pieces of legisla-
tion fail in the past because of pressure from CAHF, decided that a bill with a small 
damages award was better than no bill at all. Interview with Katherine E. Meiss, Attor-
ney, Western Center on Law and Poverty, Sacramento, Cal. (Oct. 7, 1982). 
160. District of Columbia Health Care Facilities Regulation No. 74-15, § 3 permits 
advocates to: speak with patients, advise them of their rights, assist them in asserting 
their rights, and inspect the facility. The regulation specifies the visiting hours during 
which the community groups may enter. The regulation also states that patients who 
utilize these services shall not be retaliated against. The regulation has strong enforce-
ment provisions. Violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a per diem fine 
and imprisonment. The regulation permits a civil suit by patients or community groups 
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of access complaint is litigated under a strong state regulation or 
statute. After Illinois enacted a statute that prohibits denial of 
access,161 a plaintiff successfully litigated denial of access in the 
state court.162 Subsequently, other plaintiffs were successful in 
gaining access through less expensive and time-consuming hear-
ings with the Department of Public Health.163 Once legislation 
such as the very specific Washington, D.C. regulation is enacted, 
advocates can at last use their time to ensure that residents in 
skilled nursing facilities receive proper care and are treated with 
dignity. 
E. ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
In Fuzie u. Manor Care a district court of Ohio stated that 
a patient could assert a claim for violation of the regulations as a 
third party beneficiary to the provider agreement between the 
nursing home and the state. l64 States enter into provider agree-
ments with nursing home facilities to ensure that patients will 
receive the minimum standard of care provided by federal and 
state regulations. The nursing home, in return for assuring qual-
ity care, is licensed and reimbursed by the state. A district court 
of Illinois in Roberson u. Wood also found that a patient is the 
third party beneficiary to the contract between the state and the 
facility.166 
Both courts found pendent jurisdiction. Although a contract 
action ordinarily would be maintained in state court, the plain-
that have been denied access to each other. Recovery includes damages, punitive dam-
ages, costs, and attorney's fees. 
161. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 111-V2, § 4151-104 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84) (definition 
of access), §4152-108 ("[eJvery resident shall be permitted unimpeded, private and un-
censored communication of his choice by mail, public telephone, or visitation .... "), 
and § 4152-110 (listing who may have access, the social and legal services advocates may 
provide, and the requirements and limitations on the access privilege). 
162. Strickland v. Kempiners, No. SO-L-016025 (Cook County Cir .. Ct., Ill. Feb. 20, 
1981). 
163. Illinois Citizens for Better Care v. Sherwin Manor Nursing Home, No. RS-NH-
81-08 (Dep't of Public Health, Ill. Mar. 26, 1981); Greenfield v. Pembridge House, No. 1-
LTC-81 (Evanston North Shore Health Dep't, City of Evanson, Ill. May 8, 1981); Nolon 
v. Forty Six Twenty One, Corp., No. R8-NH-81-12 (Dep't of Public Health, Ill. July 30, 
1981); Lopez v. Royal Elm Convalescent and Geriatric Center, No. R8-NH-82-17 (Dep't 
of Public Health, Ill. Oct. 19, 1982). 
164. 461 F. Supp. 689, 697-98 (N.D. Ohio 1977). 
165. 464 F. Supp. 983, 987-88 (E.D. Ill. 1979). 
33
Salzman: Access to Nursing Homes
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
742 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:709 
tiff patients were able to bring their suit in federal court. The 
Ohio court permitted adjudication in federal court because the 
nursing home must adhere to both federal and state regula-
tions. 166 The Illinois court stated that this action was pendent to 
other federal claims asserted. 167 
In a denial of access claim a patient also can bring a cause 
of action against a nursing home as a third party beneficiary to 
the provider agreement because the nursing home must comply 
with the federal and state patients' bill of rights. Following the 
reasoning in Fuzie and Roberson, the nursing home patient is 
the beneficiary of the agreement between the state and the facil-
ity and therefore can sue if the contract is violated. A patient 
may also be able to sue the nursing home directly for breach of 
the admission contract between the patient and the facility. At 
the time of entry, the resident must sign a statement that she is 
informed of her rights under the patients' bill of rights. The fa-
cility must adhere to these regulations.16s In denying access and 
thus violating the patients' bill of rights, the facility is breaching 
its agreement with the patient. 
Breach of contract is important to assert in a claim against 
a nursing home for denial of access. The difficulties in obtaining 
standing in other causes of action may result in patients and ad-
vocates never adjudicating the denial of constitutional rights or 
violation of statutory rights. Breach of contract may be the only 
cause of action that the court will examine; this may be the only 
theory that would permit advocates to enter facilities and com-
municate with the residents. 
CONCLUSION 
Nursing home patients have the same constitutional rights 
as all other citizens and are given additional protection under 
166. 461 F. Supp. at 698. 
167. 464 F. Supp. at 987-88. "[lIt arises out of a common nucleus of operative facts 
and plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." [d. 
168. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k), (k)(l) (1981); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 72527(a), 
(a)(1) (1983). 
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federal and state regulations. Yet, these rights are often denied, 
and regulatory agencies remain lax in their enforcement of pa-
tient care standards. To secure their rights, residents need 
outside help. Yet, the community groups dedicated to helping 
them are often denied entrance to the facilities. Fighting either 
denial of access or a violation of any other patient right in court 
may prove impossible due to judicial safeguards. The difficulty 
in finding either state action for infringement of constitutional 
rights, or an implied private right of action for violation of statu-
tory rights may prevent patients from enforcing their guaran-
teed rights. The answer to nursing home problems lies in 
stronger state and federal legislation to permit access by com-
munity organizations and legal services groups, stricter enforce-
ment of existing health, safety, and patients' rights regulations, 
and effective organizing of patients and relatives to demand bet-
ter quality of care. 
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